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Women, Crime and Character in the Twentieth Century 
Nicola Lacey* 
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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the fate of women in the 20th Century English criminal justice system.  
Drawing on both literary and legal sources, I venture an explanation for the relatively low 
rates at which women are adjudged to have committed crimes, despite the huge social 
changes in their legal, political and economic position during the course of the last hundred 
years.  First, I present some statistics to illustrate trends in female criminalization and 
incarceration during the 20th Century.  Second, I sketch and compare the conceptions of 
selfhood and responsible agency to be found in criminology, criminal law, the criminal 
process and 20th Century literary fiction. Third, I focus on literary representations of women, 
exploring what light women’s counter-normative behavior in fiction can shed on the patterns 
of female criminalization.   And finally, I draw out the implications of this interpretation for 
methodology in the social sciences.   
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Figure 1 
The woman who looks out of Holloway Prison with such striking dignity in this image 
provides an eloquent starting point for this paper, in which I will investigate the fate of 
women in the 20th Century English criminal justice system.  Drawing on both literary and 
legal sources, I will venture an explanation for the relatively low rates at which women are 
adjudged to have committed crimes, despite the huge social changes in their legal, political 
and economic position during the course of the last hundred years.  At the end of the 19th 
Century, notwithstanding the existence of criminal classification statutes some of which were 
specifically targeted at women, women made up just 18% of those convicted of the more 
serious offences, and 17% of those in prison.  At the time of this photograph, the women’s 
prison population was moreover swollen by the incarceration of suffragettes.  We do not 
know if this woman was a suffragette, but the caption tells us that the window through which 
she looks has been shattered in a suffragette protest outside the prison. So we might expect 
the image to stand as a symbol of agentic female law-breaking as women slowly come to 
assume rights, occupy roles and gain opportunities exclusion from which had helped keep 
them among a small minority of law-breakers for the previous 150 years.   Instead, Holloway 
Prison stands as a metaphor for what turned out to be a very different 20th Century story: one 
in which the gendered pattern of criminalisation became more rather than less marked.   An 
emblem of Victorian discipline re-imagined (though never entirely realised) as mental 
hospital, Holloway exemplifies the continued tendency to medicalise female criminality.  
Recently closed and destined to become housing, we might regard its demise as a product of 
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London’s inflated property market.  But of greater significance for my project in this paper is 
the fact that the repeated reports documenting the prison’s failings betoken the lack of any 
coherent policy on women offenders through much of the Century – this lack itself 
representing a perplexity about the very notion of female deviance.1 
 
 
Amid the huge variety of forms of crime and criminalisation across time and space, the 
gendered nature of judgments about criminalisation is remarkably pervasive.  In most 
developed countries over the last 200 years, women make up a small minority of those 
formally identified as offenders.  This in itself makes the gendering of social processes of 
criminalisation a central question for the social sciences (a fact which had however escaped 
them until alerted by the pioneering work of feminist scholars like Carol Smart (1976; 1995), 
Frances Heidensohn (1968; 1985) and Ngaire Naffine (1987)).     Yet underlining the fact that 
these differences are socially produced, research  by Malcolm Feeley, Deborah Little  and 
                                                          
1   See for example the Prison Inspectorate’s Report of 2013 
http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/prisons/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2014/03/holloway-2013.pdf 
Despite some improvements in subsequent years - 
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2016/02/Holloway-web-2015.pdf  - Holloway was scheduled for 
closure in 2016.   For a telling picture of the pathologies of women’s imprisonment in the 
Twentieth Century, and of the power of gender norms in shaping the discipline of women in 
prison, see Carlen (1983). 
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Hadar Aviram (Feeley and Little 1981; Feeley 1994; Feeley and Aviram 2010,2 has shown 
that there are  historical exceptions to the usual gender ratio,  one being London in the late 
17th and early 18th Centuries, when women and men were  convicted at the Old Bailey in 
roughly equal numbers (see also Smith 2014; Godfrey 2014).  Indeed all the West European 
countries which Feeley and Aviram studied saw a marked decline of female criminality 
during the 18th and 19th Centuries. 
 
In a series of lectures delivered a decade ago, I argued that we could draw on cultural 
resources, notably realist novels, to shed light on the reasons for these variations in gender 
patterns of criminalisation.  My starting point was Daniel Defoe’s vivid female offender, 
Moll Flanders (1722).   In the early 18th Century, Defoe found it natural to write a novel 
whose heroine was a sexually adventurous, socially marginal property offender.  Only half a 
century later, this would have unthinkable.  In the book which eventually emerged from my 
attempts to think through how and why this had happened, and what it meant for criminal law 
                                                          
2 Feeley and Aviram’s data show women to have been a significantly greater proportion of 
offenders in several European countries during the 17th and early 18th Centuries, with the 
proportion dropping from the mid 18th Century through the 19th Century.  They suggest that 
the decline of women in the criminal process was a product of a move from public to private 
patriarchy, as the development of industrial capitalism, and associated changes in family 
structure, consolidated by protective legislation, deprived women of forms of economic 
opportunity and social status available to them in the era of family capitalism in which their 
labour was often crucial to household finances. 
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(Lacey 2008),3 I argued that the disappearance of Moll Flanders, and her supersession in the 
annals of literary female offenders by heroines like Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891), was a 
metaphor for fundamental changes in ideas of selfhood, gender and social order. And I 
suggested that it was easier to insert women into the (of course highly gendered) conceptions 
of criminal character which drove early 18th Century judgments of responsibility than to 
accommodate them within a conception of responsibility as founded in choice and capacity – 
a framework which was emerging just as the acceptance of women’s capacity to exercise 
their agency was becoming more constrained, and women were increasingly subject to 
informal discipline, as their bodies came to bear the burden of representing bourgeois 
respectability.  
 
 
At the conclusion of the lectures, I put a question to my audience: that of whether, in 2008, 
Moll Flanders was thinkable again. This, of course, was disingenuous: the question was 
really to myself, and I have been puzzling about it ever since.  Answering it, however, 
required me to complete my historical analysis of criminal responsibility-attribution  through 
the 20th century – a project which was concluded last year (Lacey 2016). At which point, the 
British Academy’s invitation to deliver the Maccabaean Lecture provided an opportunity to 
bring the social sciences and humanities into dialogue with one another in the most suitable 
forum in the country for such an attempt.  So I decided to bring my story of women, crime 
and character up to the millennium. 
                                                          
3 The thesis of my book is consistent with Feeley’s and Aviram’s interpretation (2010), while 
concentrating on a somewhat different evidential base. 
 6 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.   First, I present some statistics to illustrate trends in female 
criminalization and incarceration during the 20th Century.  Second, I sketch and compare the 
conceptions of selfhood and responsible agency to be found in criminology, criminal law, the 
criminal process and 20th Century literary fiction.  Here I note various methodological 
complexities as compared with a literary analysis of the earlier period, while arguing that law 
and literature have continued to share a sufficient range of preoccupations to maintain the 
validity of the project, albeit with some modification. Third, I focus on literary 
representations of women, exploring what light women’s counter-normative behavior in 
fiction can shed on the patterns of female criminalization.   And finally, I draw out the 
implications of this interpretation for methodology in the social sciences.   
 
Gender, crime and punishment through the 20th Century 
Let me begin, then, by considering the ways in which criminal law ‘sees’, ‘thinks about’, 
constructs and responds to women.  To assess the gender dynamics of criminal 
responsibility in the 20th Century, it is useful to set out from some fairly basic data, of the 
kind from which Feeley and Little launched their 18th-19th Century analysis in 1981.  I should 
preface this discussion by acknowledging that official crime statistics must carry a substantial 
health warning.  First, with the exception of rare offences such as homicide, changes in the 
definition and range of offences, and in the way in which they are grouped in the official 
records, make it tricky to construct robust series over a significant period of time.  Second, 
the official statistics represent – though they make it all too easy to forget this – the 
culmination of a complex set of processes of social labelling, lay and official judgments, the 
exercise of power, as opposed to ‘raw facts’.  Third, the techniques developed in the late 20th 
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Century to counter these difficulties – notably crime surveys, which give us some purchase 
on the extent to which the official records distort the underlying behaviour which they 
purport to represent - are not available for the whole period.  As a result of these difficulties, 
some forms of criminology have tended to avoid the official statistics altogether.  Moreover 
some feminist criminologists have been further prompted in this direction by the sense that 
the official statistics risk strengthening the reified, biological understandings of criminality 
which are so pervasive in early criminology, and which persisted for a yet longer period in 
relation to women (Smart 1976, 1995; Heidensohn 1968, 1985; Naffine 1987, 1996; Allen 
1987). Though each contains articles which draw on official statistics, neither the latest 
edition of the Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Liebling et al eds. 2017) nor the Oxford 
Handbook of Gender, Sex and Crime (Gartner and McCarthy eds. 2014) includes a single 
table or figure presenting officially recorded crime.  My view, however, is that statistics- 
avoidance in criminology has been overdone, and that the statistics over a century do tell us 
something important.  While they gloss over the forms of offending and labelling behaviour 
and the motivations underlying the figures, they nonetheless represent real exercise of state 
power, and track its focus and extent over time.  My approach here has therefore been to 
enlist the assistance of a very skilled econometrician4 with whom I worked to construct the 
most robust set of data possible, at ten year intervals through the century.  
 
Here, first, are the imprisonment figures, showing both women as a proportion of the prison 
population and women prisoners as a proportion of the female population as a whole.  Unlike 
the crime statistics, these figures are easy to collect, and they are very interesting, for at least 
two reasons.  First, the number of women in prison in the first decade of the Century will 
                                                          
4 David Hope, to whose meticulous work I owe a huge debt. 
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certainly have been swollen by the punitive state reaction to the suffragettes’ protests, which 
led to around a thousand women being imprisoned between the turn of the Century and the 
First World War- a significant number given the overall size of the women’s prison 
population at the time (Purvis 1995).  Another factor is that the figures will have been 
affected by changes in how the statistics are constructed, or by the impact of the criminal 
classification statutes of the period, which targeted particular groups of women (Zedner 
1991). Whatever the detailed reasons, women turn out to have been quite a substantial 
minority of the prison population not long after the appearance of victimised, relatively 
powerless Tess of the d’Urbervilles.    If the criminal classification statutes are indeed an 
important part of the explanation, this would back up my argument in Women Crime and 
Character (Lacey 2008) that gender-specific ideas of criminal character as a basis for 
responsibility- attribution might facilitate the criminalisation of women, while strictly 
capacity or opportunity-based  practices of responsibility–attribution might be less likely to 
lead to the criminalisation of women, in circumstances in which women’s opportunities were 
restricted and their agentic capacities called into doubt.   
 
Women as a proportion of the prison population in the Twentieth Century: Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 
As you see from these Figures, while absolute numbers of women in prison have risen over 
the course of the 20th Century (Allen and Dempsey 2016), the female proportion of the 
overall prison population has in fact fallen from 17% to around 5%, while the drop in the 
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proportion of the overall female population incarcerated has fallen even further.5  Overall, 
what is most striking is the fact that, even if we take as our starting point 1930 – just two 
years after the franchise was extended to all women, marking the moment of women’s full 
formal entry into citizenship – the figures are remarkably stable, and remarkably low, right 
through to the end of the Century, albeit with a spike during the Second World War and a 
significant rise in the Century’s final decade.    
 
Now let us turn to the crime statistics, for which we have constructed three decadely 
measures through the century: women as a proportion of those convicted of violence against 
the person; as a proportion of those convicted of a group of common property offences; and 
as a proportion of those convicted of all indictable offences.   
 
Figures 3.1 - 3.6 
Notwithstanding a steady increase in the female proportion of those convicted of violence 
against the person from the 1960s on, and a less marked but definite concomitant rise in the 
                                                          
5  Unsurprisingly, and as can be seen from the figure for 1940, the proportion of women rose 
during each of the two world wars, reaching 18.4% in 1916. Persisting gender differences in 
imprisonment can be seen in a wide range of jurisdictions on World Prison Brief data for 
2016.  Among democratic advanced economies, the proportion of women in the prison 
system ranges from 3.4% in France up to 9.3% in the USA, via 4.5% in England and Wales, 
5.1% in Scotland, 5.6% in Sweden, and 8.0% in Australia (World Prison Brief data, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief-data  (accessed 18 March 2017). 
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property offences, in the case of violence, women at the millennium do not reach the 
proportionate representation of the beginning of the Century, while in property offences, they 
do no more than match it.   
Again, we must remember that these figures smooth out huge differences between different 
forms of offending – and in particular give no sense of the impact and scale of forms of 
criminalisation trained with particular intensity on the social control of women – notably 
offences relating to prostitution, infanticide and abortion (Smart 1976; Burman and 
Gelsthorpe 2017; Peay 2017; Phoenix 2017).  The prison figures also exclude other forms of 
semi-carceral social control such as approved schools and commitment to mental hospitals 
(Harcourt 2006; O’Sullivan and O’Donnell 2007).  Yet, notwithstanding some increase in the 
late 20th Century, compare the relative stability of these figures with the dramatic changes in 
women’s legal, social and economic status and opportunities during this period (as crudely 
represented here by figures on labour market participation and higher education; and then by 
a Table presenting a timeline of a wider range of relevant changes across the Century). 
 
Figures 3, 4 and 5  
These are changes which, of course, fall very far short of what many of us still hope for, but 
which – particularly in the second half of the Century - may nonetheless justly be accounted 
nothing less than a quiet revolution.  The contrast with criminalisation and imprisonment is 
extraordinary.  Far from fulfilling the panicked prognostications of early criminologists such 
as Luke Owen Pike (1873-1876), who anticipated that women’s liberation would lead to a 
surge in female crime, it looks as if, at least in relation to the more serious forms of offending 
which result in custodial sentences, the changes in women’s official criminalisation have 
been modest, with even the proportionate rise in female violence shaped in part by a decline 
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in levels of male violence rather than any decisive change in female behaviour (Smith 2014).  
And while it is easy to satirize the fears on this count which plagued the late Victorian and 
Edwardian male imagination, there does seem to be something important to be explained 
about why the huge social changes in women’s legal, economic and political position during 
the 20th Century appear not to have been felt to anything like a comparable degree in the 
criminal process.  To unravel this question, I will suggest that it is helpful to put legal and 
literary resources into dialogue with one another. 
 
Agency and responsibility in 20th Century Law and Literature.   
 
Turning to that task, I must immediately confront and deal with some methodological 
challenges which confront any attempt to extend a legal and literary analysis of women’s 
agency and criminality from the 19th into the 20th Century.  The first complication is simply 
that the field of cultural representation has burgeoned during the last century, prompted by 
both technological change and economically and politically driven developments such as 
increasing prosperity and education.  Whereas it was easy to justify a focus on literary fiction 
as one of the most significant forms of cultural representation in the 18th and 19th Centuries, 
printed fiction competes in the 20th Century with radio and television series and feature films 
– to name just three comparable narrative forms - as well as with the theatrical and visual arts 
which were already significant in earlier centuries.   
 
Moreover while it was reasonably easy to distinguish a recognisable genre of literary fiction 
– realism – in the 18th Century, even in the 19th, the genre was diversifying as the Gothic 
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novel produced offshoots such as sensation fiction and science fiction.  There was, of course, 
a debate, to which authors like Charles Dickens and Wilkie Collins contributed, about 
whether these distinctions were meaningful (Lacey 2008: 122-3), but that need not concern 
us here. What is obvious, and has made selecting a sample of fiction far more difficult for the 
20th Century, is that this diversification has continued apace, with specialist genres such as 
detective fiction, crime novels, so-called ‘chick lit’, magical realism, postmodernism, 
proliferating at an ever greater rate during the course of the Century.  So, even restricting 
myself to British and Irish novels – as I have done, so as to remain consistent with the sample 
from my 2008 book – the choice is vast.   I cannot claim to have been able to produce a very 
scientific way of defining the literature on which I am focusing, other than to say that it is the 
sort of literary fiction which might well find its way on to a Booker Prize list, and must have 
a distinctly realist ambition. Justifying the focus on books rather than soap operas or films 
seems easier to me, given that the latter developed after the beginning of the century, and 
have accumulated in reach and importance since the 1960s. But it should be acknowledged at 
the outset that my effort in this paper is a very small part of a potential project which would 
consider the changing legal and cultural constructions of women behaving badly in a wider 
range of cultural forms, with crime and detective fiction, film and soap operas a potentially 
fruitful terrain which has indeed already begun to be mined by imaginative criminologists, 
literary and media scholars.6   
 
The second methodological challenge, which I had not anticipated, is this:  When I started 
researching and consulting friends and colleagues about a sample of books for my original 
                                                          
6 See for example, Young 1995); Sparks (1992); Naffine (1996);  McCaw (2011); Surette 
(1998: 5th edition 2015); Williams (2002);  Dolin (2007). 
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project, it was extremely easy to construct a list of realist novels in which women were 
central characters and were moreover centrally engaged in, if not criminal, at least counter-
normative or strongly agentic behaviour.  Indeed many of them had given their names to the 
novels in which they appeared: Daniel Defoe’s Roxana (1724); Samuel Richardson’s Pamela 
(1740) and Clarissa (1747-8); Henry Fielding’s Amelia (1751); Frances Burney’s Evelina 
(1778), Cecilia (1782) and Camilla (1796); Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria (1798); Maria 
Edgeworth’s Belinda (1801); Jane Austen’s Emma (1815); Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre 
(1847) and Shirley (1849); Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton (1859); Margaret Oliphant’s 
Hester (1883).  Curiously, and I think significantly, it has proved much harder to identify 20th 
Century literary fiction in which women are both central characters and counter-cultural if 
not criminal.  Indeed, as we shall see, some of the most central, powerful and counter-cultural 
female characters in 20th Century realist fiction are portrayed as in some way involved or 
collusive in their own victimisation. 
 
I should, however, have anticipated this second problem, because I now see that it relates 
very closely to a third, which on the face of it could have been fatal to the enterprise of this 
paper. This is the explosion of literary modernism in the early part of the 20th Century, which 
in fundamentally reshaping the form and, arguably, function of the novel, fractured the close 
analogy between the representational and indeed didactic or ethical purposes which the novel 
and the criminal law had arguably shared since the early 18th Century.  In light of modernism, 
with it radical questioning of the veracity of literary representations, of the unity of coherence 
of the subject, and of the knowability of self and others, influential legal/literary scholars 
including Jan-Melissa Schramm (2000) and Alexander Welsh (1992) have concluded that the 
disanalogies between law and literature become such that a certain kind of legal/literary 
interpretive project no longer makes sense.  
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Here I would agree with Rex Ferguson’s argument in his persuasive Criminal Law and the 
Modernist Novel (2013) that, despite important emerging differences in the form and function 
of literature in the first three decades of the 20th Century, the analogies between both the 
problems which law and literary authors confronted, and the ways in which they resolved 
them, are sufficiently close to sustain a meaningful project of interdisciplinary analysis.  To 
understand why this is the case, we need to look in some further detail at the relevant shifts 
and trends in the construction of subjecthood, agency and responsibility in literature, in the 
criminal process, and in the criminal law.   
 
Let us start with the criminal law.  As I have already suggested, the 19th Century’s 
systematising and modernising project, with its gradual construction of doctrinal rules 
constituting the responsible subject of criminal law in certain ways, and of protocols and 
institutions capable of testing and refining these doctrinal rules, was coming to fruition at the 
turn of the Century, with notable developments including the revival of the possibility of the 
accused testifying in her own defence in the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act, and the creation of 
the Court of Appeal in 1908.  With regular professional representation of both sides in 
serious criminal cases, and a growing body of systematic literature in the form of treatises 
and textbooks, doctrines of mens rea and defence were gradually constituting the subjective 
responsibility of a person with normal cognitive and volitional capacities for the conduct 
elements of an offence as the paradigm condition for conviction – and one moreover which, 
as Woolmington7 confirmed definitively in 1935,  the state had the burden of proving  beyond 
                                                          
7 DPP v Woolmington, [1935] UKHL 1. 
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reasonable doubt in all its elements.  A system based on the trial as a process for inculpation, 
rather than an opportunity for exculpation, was being consolidated during this period, with 
presumptions such as that a person intended any natural consequences of their actions slowly 
being reconstructed as evidential rather than conclusive legal mechanisms.  Strict liability 
offences based on causal outcome responsibility were growing in number and significance, 
but occupied a marginal place in the central ideology of the criminal law, which was 
increasingly focused on capacity responsibility, particularly in its subjective form, as both a 
device both legitimating and coordinating legal judgments of guilt. 
 
On the face of it, this move to subjectivism in the criminal law presents both analogies and 
disanalogies with the constitution of the subject in literary modernism.  On the one hand, the 
centrality of subjective experience and of psychological states to the meaning of action and 
indeed the interpretation of the world is central to both legal subjectivism and the intense turn 
away from representation and towards expression of experience in writers like Henry James, 
Virginia Woolf or James Joyce.  On the other hand, the legitimating and coordinating 
function of the principle of subjectivism in the criminal law seems to turn on an assumption 
about the unity of the subject and its knowability and transparency – both to the subject 
herself and to others, notably police officers and members of a jury – which is under 
sustained challenge in the novel of this period.  In literature, authors – particularly those 
writing from an in some sense émigré or outsider perspective, whether because of their 
national origins or their gender or social status - seized on the crisis of authority and social 
disruptions of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries to put the very projects of truth, reason 
and transparency into question.  By contrast, the law continued with its systematising – 
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confusingly given the literary language - process of ‘modernisation’, undeterred by the 
surrounding crisis of authority.  For criminal law, with its concrete regulatory and power-
imposing tasks, did not enjoy the luxury of exploring the metaphysical crisis which arguably 
underpinned the moments of obscurity, multiplicity, unpredictability, insanity, fragmentation, 
impenetrability or incomprehensibility pervasive in novels of the period.  Hence it turned 
instead to the construction of a range of protocols and institutional arrangements which 
allowed that regulatory, controlling and normative project to continue.  Subjectivism and 
psychology, which bore the weight of the collapse of meaning and predictability in the novel, 
became the engine through which knowledge and truth was constructed in the law. They 
were, however, as we shall see, regimes of knowledge and truth in which women were 
incompletely accommodated. 
 
Indeed in both law and literature, these modernising projects – whether of the construction or 
the subversion of the responsible subject – were ones in which women were either 
incompletely, or differentially, inserted. And in both fields, assumptions about subjectivity or 
its collapse were strongly overlaid with gender norms and assumptions.  In the criminal law, 
women’s assertion of subjectivity was – other than in a small number of female-gendered 
offences – almost definitionally tied up with a breach of gender norms, and hence tended to 
attract either a move towards pathologisation in the form, for example, of a mental incapacity 
explanation or defence; or a reading of ‘double deviance’: a breach of the criminal law and a 
breach of femininity.  As Hilary Allen nicely put it, criminal law struggled to place women as 
‘reasonable persons’ (Allen 1998).  In literature, too, we find this divided tendency: an 
exaggerated experience of interiority or even mental collapse sits relatively easily with 
femaleness (Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1924); Sylvia Tietjens of Ford Madox Ford’s 
Parade’s End 1924-1928); Doris Lessing’s Martha Quest of the Children of Violence series 
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(1952-1969)); while rational female agency, particularly where combined with a successful 
presence in social spaces beyond domesticity, such as work, invites a particularly punitive 
interpretation.   
 
In a range of ways, as Lindsay Farmer has argued (Farmer 2016), and as I have also shown in 
earlier work (Lacey 2016), the move to a subjective version of capacity responsibility implied 
a dualism in the criminal law as between responsible subjecthood on the one hand, and the 
conduct for which responsibility was attributed on the other.  And this in turn implied a 
certain de-moralisation of the criminal law – or at least a projection of the site of judgment 
onto conduct as opposed to responsibility or mens rea, which was now constructed in factual, 
psychological, non-moral terms (Farmer 2016; Lacey 2016; Norrie 2014).  This means that 
any study of the literature of this period must focus as much on the forms of conduct for 
which women are held responsible as on the assumptions about their responsible agency 
which accompany them.  Moreover this ‘factualisation’ or ‘demoralisation’ of responsible 
agency underwrites another analogy between law and literature in this period. For it is 
prompted by a discomfort with judgment which is a counterpart of the scepticism about 
judgment which was pervasive in the novel.  In addition,  the crisis of truth and judgement 
found in the modernist novel realises itself in the consequential reliance in the law on either a 
jury’s interpretation of testamentary narrative or its evaluation of expert evidence, each of 
which produces its own epistemological uncertainties which the law does not resolve, but 
rather glosses over through the mechanism of jury secrecy.  Unable to refuse judgment in the 
style of the novel, English criminal law displaced it onto the secret deliberations of a lay jury 
or the inscrutable judgment of an expert.  The law’s vulnerability here is perhaps exposed 
most clearly in cases in which mental incapacity is put at issue in the trial: a position into 
which a disproportionate number of women offenders fall (Allen 1982; Edwards 1984).   
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These analogies between the situation of criminal justice and that of the modernist novel of 
the early 20th Century can be further appreciated if we supplement our vision of the criminal 
law with that of the criminal and penal processes which surrounded it.  In the late 19th 
Century, as the criminal classification statutes attest, the essentialised, biological view of 
crime to be found in the positivist criminology of Lombroso and Ferrero (1895) was itself 
shaping criminalising and penal arrangements in the form of mechanisms which certainly 
made bold (indeed, from our perspective outrageous) claims to ‘truth’.  But in the early 20th 
Century, this notion of biological pathology was beginning to give place to a vision shaped 
rather by notions of social pathology: with the acceptance that social and economic 
circumstances constituted important determinants of criminal conduct (Smart 1976: Chapter 
2; Heidensohn 1985: Chapter 6).  This socially deterministic vision was deeply threatening to 
the very notion of a responsible subject or the notion of stable character, and it echoed the 
focus in literary fiction on the role of environment in shaping both personality and conduct.  
Of course, the influence of biological theories did not disappear overnight either in criminal 
justice or in literature (think of the strange combination of biologism and social analysis 
which underpins Henry James’ portrayal of Kate Croy in The Wings of the Dove, (1902) 
Radclyffe Hall’s analysis of lesbianism in The Well of Loneliness (1928); or D.H. Lawrence’s 
view of sexuality in Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1928)). Hence biological and social theories 
enjoyed an extended period of uncomfortable cohabitation - albeit with women remaining 
disproportionately situated within the biological interpretation.   The way in which the 
criminal process managed the resulting tensions was through a division of labour between the 
criminal law and the penal process, which became increasingly constructed around what 
David Garland has called ‘penal welfarism’ (Garland 1985, 2001); in other words, the 
assumption that the penal and other arrangements should be designed in terms of 
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manipulating offenders’ environment so as to maximise their chances of reform and personal 
change.  Within this distinctive configuration, criminal justice institutions were closely 
articulated with emerging mental health and social welfare institutions in a quite new 
constellation of institutions and discourses emerging from the Victorian ameliorative 
projects: institutions and discourses which were markedly less retributive but no less 
paternalistic than their Victorian predecessors.  In penal welfarism as in criminal law, a turn 
to reliance on scientific expertise provided a partial solution to problems of legitimation and 
coordination while, as we shall see, storing up epistemological difficulties similar to those 
being explored in the modernist novel.  And in a time lag which characterises the relationship 
between literature and law throughout the Century, those difficulties made themselves felt 
more fully in the criminal justice system in the second half of the Century.  Meanwhile, the 
specifically gendered qualities of the emerging forms of penal welfarism, particularly in 
relation to female delinquency and mental incapacity, exaggerated an existing cultural 
tendency to label women’s counter-normative behaviour in terms of illness rather than 
oppositional responsible agency.  While – perhaps significantly - recorded in relation to a 
man (Septimus Smith, a victim of shellshock), the invincible, patriarchal rationality of the 
scientific authority which legitimised these judgments is bitingly criticised in Virginia 
Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1924). 
 
Finally, in terms of the analogies between literary fiction and criminal law during this period, 
we should note that,  just as the law was itself having to negotiate certain challenges to 
authority and epistemological perplexities similar to those explored in depth in the modernist 
novel, doing so by developing its own distinctive protocols as well by an increasing turn to 
the truths constructed by scientific discourses, conversely, the novel never entirely abandoned 
its representational and interpretive roles.  Certainly, modernist novels deliberately eschewed 
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the aesthetic of linearity, progress and narrative closure which characterise the great realist 
novels of the 19th Century; they also, as we have seen, pondered the multiplicity, 
fragmentation and instability of the self.  But, as Terry Eagleton has noted (Eagleton 2005), 
the move can never be complete: individual agency reasserts itself in forms such as resistance 
to plot line, and the explorations of fragmented consciousness typical of, say, Virginia Woolf, 
or the disjointed quotidian ‘epiphanies’ recounted in James Joyce, themselves partake in a 
certain form of representation, a certain engagement with and indeed interpretation of human 
being and reality.  Moreover the analogy between the novel’s ethical and the law’s regulatory 
purposes still held.  Woolf may have protested that politics should be separate from art, and 
that the world of the novel is brought into being simply by the novel itself.  But few of her 
readers, contemporary or current, could possibly read Orlando (1928) or even Mrs Dalloway 
(1924) as politically innocent texts, artefacts which give us no vision of aspects of human 
being or dilemmas about how to live (Eagleton 2005: 313).  Moreover Orlando as a character 
is vividly agentic, even amid the radically historically determined nature of her/his identity, 
and notably her/his gender identity.  Think of Orlando’s biting satire on the construction of 
gender, or Woolf’s devastating depiction in Mrs Dalloway (1924) of Lady Bradshaw’s 
disappearance, by way of marriage, into the maw of patriarchal power: as Woolf memorably 
puts it, ’Fifteen years ago she had gone under. It was nothing you could put your finger on; 
there had been no scene, no snap; only the slow sinking, waterlogged, of her will into his.’ 
(Woolf 1924/2013: 118).  Few instances of even high modernism exemplify the extremes of 
opacity and unknowablility of the incident in the Marabar caves in E M Forster’s A Passage 
to India (1924) - often cited as the paradigm instance of modernism’s focus on the limits of 
knowledge, and one directly relevant to legal judgment since the unknowable incident 
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becomes the subject of a trial.8   For example, Ford Madox Brown’s trilogy, Parade’s End 
(1924-28)  combines a representational family and social history with a moment-by-moment 
exploration of Christopher Tietjen’s experience of emotional chaos, in the more subversive 
modernist style which characterises Ford’s presentation of the radically unknowable Captain 
Ashburnham of The Good Soldier (1915).9  Moreover, while aspects of modernism doubtless 
touched much literary fiction during this period, a vast amount of fiction continued in a more 
straightforwardly realist vein.  A key instance would be F. Tennyson Jesse’s A Pin to See the 
Peepshow, published in 1934, and of great interest from our point of view because it is 
broadly based on the notorious murder case against Edith Thomson and Frederick Bywaters 
in 1922.   
 
How do these trends in the construction of the responsible subject in criminal law, criminal 
justice and literary fiction proceed in the second half of the 20th Century?  As Eagleton has 
noted, the trauma of the Second World War did not unleash anything like the explosion of a 
radically new form of literary fiction such as the modernism created by the émigré or 
otherwise ‘outsider’ writers of the early 20th Century.  One can only speculate on the reasons 
for this: perhaps one factor was the sense that, unlike the First World World War, the Second 
World War had been unavoidable and fought in a just cause; another that the subsequent 
                                                          
8  The Marabar caves incident is of particular interest because it implies a clash of testimony 
between two subjects each of whom speak – or fail to speak – from marginalised positions: a 
white woman in the context of an alleged sexual impropriety, and an Indian man.  Ultimately 
it is the default prejudice, as reflected in the colonial power embodied in the legal system, 
which is constructed as claiming (a fragile form of) knowledge and credibility.  
9 On which see Ferguson (2013): Chapter 3. 
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change of government to a (Labour) administration with an ambitious agenda of national 
renewal led to a more optimistic cultural ambience.  Whatever the reason, literary fiction of 
the second half of the Century settled back into a primarily realist and representational mode, 
albeit with further diversification of genres – notably a burgeoning of specifically crime and 
detective fiction - and some significant points of innovation, again coming from new voices 
in some sense from the margins in either racial, colonial, sexuality or gender terms – 
postcolonial and feminist novels being key examples.10  New forms of subjectivity were 
explored and, to some extent, normalised – particularly in terms of sexuality and gender 
identity (in for example Jeanette Winterson’s Oranges are Not the Only Fruit (1985) or 
Jackie Kay’s Trumpet (1998).  But the conscious, capable and responsible subject more or 
less returns to centre stage, her character development and her ability to learn from 
cumulative experiences once again the primary focus of literary fiction.  Over much of its 
terrain, literary fiction contracts, concentrating itself upon emotional and domestic dramas.  
Significantly from our point of view, however, in the latter part of the Century, we can 
identify some key literary figures who seem to represent an interesting amalgam of 
environmentally produced deviance with older tropes of bad character or even evil – a trend 
nicely evoked by Fay Weldon’s Life and Loves of a She-Devil (1983), considered in more 
detail below; and the more ambitious work of Angela Carter, which, in a manner reminiscent 
of Woolf’s Orlando (1924), reaches for the tools of fantasy to express a vision of fluid, 
                                                          
10  Key examples include Doris Lessing’s Children of Violence series (1952-69); Jackie 
Kay’s Trumpet (1998); Zadie Smith’s White Teeth (2000); Andrea Levy’s Small Island 
(2004); and Angela Carter’s  Wise Children (1991). 
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elusive identity, and to conjure a world in which gender, identity and even time are radically 
in question.11 
 
Developments in criminal law and criminal justice to some extent diverge in the post-Second 
World War era.  Until the last two decades of the Century, the criminal law continued on its 
path towards a systematic ‘general part’ consisting of principles applying across the offences 
– as epitomised by Glanville Williams’ key 1953 text, Criminal Law: The General Part 
(Williams 1953, 1961). The field also saw some significant efforts at substantive 
systematisation, for example in the Theft Act 1968 and the construction of a category of 
sexual offences in the Sexual Offences Act 1956.  Hence the myth of the gender-neutral legal 
subject persisted – disrupted only occasionally, as in cases such as Thornton and Ahluwalia12 
in the field of women’s self-defence, which put the reality of gendered power relations at the 
heart of doctrinal argument.  But the 1960s and 1970s saw, in criminal justice, developments 
which reflect in quite a fascinating way, several decades later, a close analogue to the novel’s 
epistemological crisis of the modernist period.  As the treatment/cure-oriented versions of 
penal welfarism, organised around the so-called ‘rehabilitative ideal’, gathered pace, tensions 
between the legal conception of a capable, choosing subject who could justly be held 
responsible, and a more deterministic vision of subjects and their conduct as shaped by social 
environment or mental pathology, came to a head.  On the one hand, the more committed 
advocates of the rehabilitative and treatment ethic – Baroness Barbara Wootton key among 
them (Wootton 1959, 1963) – followed through on the logic of a determinist ontology by 
                                                          
11  See for example Nights at the Circus (1984) and the more dystopian The Passion of New 
Eve (1977).  
12 R v Thornton [1996] 1 WLR 1174; R v Ahluwalia 1993) 96 Cr App R 133. 
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arguing for an abandonment of the mens rea principle in criminal law, in effect implying the 
disappearance of the responsible subject and a shift in the trial process from judgment to 
diagnosis within an entirely forward-looking and scientifically driven model.  Liberal 
proponents of the responsibility principle, notably H.L.A. Hart (Hart 1968),13 defended a 
middle path, asserting the moral centrality of a requirement of proof of mens rea in most 
cases, while allowing the defences to recognise and accommodate situations in which the 
pressures or influences of environment, circumstance or illness were so great as to undermine 
even the relatively undemanding conditions of agency set by the criminal law.   
 
But a more radical riposte to the Wootton position was also forming itself, and its realisation 
in some ways echoes what Eagleton sees as the novel’s retreat into older ways of representing 
the world (Eagleton 2005: 331-8). Driven by anxiety about the excesses of state power 
implied by the myth of ‘treatment’, the implicit appeal to a vague norm of social health, and 
the consequent establishment of wide and hard to challenge official discretion on the part of 
parole boards, prison medics, social workers and others, a civil libertarian critique of the 
rehabilitative ideal gained ground, first in the United States and then in other countries, from 
the early 1970s on (American Friends’ Service Committee 1971; von Hirsch 1976).  But this 
civil libertarian reaction was not the only form which the rejection of the rehabilitative ideal 
took. Perhaps yet more significant was a strong reassertion of the moral centrality of a subject 
fully responsible for her wrongdoing, with criminal judgment reframed within a 
‘neoclassical’ model of what Lindsay Farmer has called ‘the punishable subject’ (Farmer 
2016):  a neo-retributive vision in which criminal responsibility is a projection of the moral 
                                                          
13 See in particular Chapter 7, ‘Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility’. 
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conditions of justified punishment, themselves premised on individual moral desert.14  This 
‘remoralisation’ of criminalisation and punishment has been widely reflected in western legal 
systems, including those of Britain, where punishment commensurate with desert – albeit 
accompanied by forward-looking concerns such as deterrence and incapacitation – has 
reasserted itself as the central principle of criminalisation, with legal doctrines of mens rea 
holding firmly to intentionality, knowledge and foresight as the paradigm conditions of 
responsibility, albeit articulated more closely with an evaluative judgment of the overall 
wrongfulness of the conduct in question.   
 
This has not meant, however, that the appeal to science has been altogether abandoned.  In 
cases of mental incapacity, of course, expert testimony has continued to underpin 
modifications of the responsibility principle, mainly via the defences.  And in a significant 
development, we have seen the emergence of forms of preventive, pre-inchoate 
criminalisation in areas such as terrorism and public disorder. These, I have argued (Lacey 
2016: 147-73), constitute a new form of character responsibility, albeit one premised not 
primarily on bad character understood in terms of evil or wickedness but in terms of 
presentation of risk, with actuarial or clinical forms of risk assessment accordingly occupying 
an important place among contemporary legal form of responsibility attribution.   Perceived 
dangerousness as measured by clinical or actuarial data or – worse – popular sentiment and 
fear, has become, particularly in certain areas of criminal law, the new form of bad character 
(Lacey 2016: 147-73).  And, as in the case of women’s self-defence, as well as in the 18th 
Century, the conceptions of what count as good and bad character are strongly shaped by 
                                                          
14 For an extreme expression of a modern retributivist position, see Moore (1998); for more 
moderate versions, see von Hirsch (1993); Duff (2001). 
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social norms relative to gender, as to race and class.  Significantly for our purposes, the forms 
of risk and danger which underpin the new hybrid patterns of responsibility-attribution tend 
not to be associated strongly with women.15  In life, the emblematic figures of late 20th 
Century female crime, Myra Hindley or Rosemary West, can hardly be compared with Moll 
Flanders,  involved as they were in extreme violence, associated with a powerful male figure 
and involving sexual cruelty, rather than in profit oriented business with a generous helping 
of sexual activity on the side…  They lend themselves to characterisation in the terms of evil 
or pathology, rather than remediable and putatively rational bad behaviour. 
 
In criminology, too, we have seen some significant shifts in the ways in which criminality is 
imagined, represented and explained during this period.  In some ways echoing literary 
modernism’s focus on subjective experience – and perhaps enabled by the relative 
demoralisation of criminal law and factualisation of criminal responsibility – an important 
strand in the sociology of deviance from the 1960s on explored the lifeworld of the 
(invariably male) offender, in an almost existential celebration of the excitement of 
transgression (Smart 1976; Heidensohn 1985),  and a decisive rejection of remaining traces 
of the early criminological view of crime as pathology.  In labelling theory, too, we saw a 
shift to a focus on the mechanisms of power through which criminalisation is constructed, 
and a move away from the assumption of crime as a unitary or natural phenomenon. This 
move was also encouraged by the feminist criminologies emerging from the late 1960s on, 
which mounted a telling critique of the ways in which, particularly in relation to women, 
                                                          
15 Exceptions may of course pertain among certain groups whose intersectional 
characteristics are perceived to present risks: further empirical work is required on this 
important point. 
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older, essentialist criminological assumptions continued to exert considerable power, 
particularly in those areas in which criminal law’s gaze was trained specifically upon women 
– areas which make up a small part of officially recorded crime, but exert an enormous 
disciplinary force (Smart 1976; Naffine 1987; Jackson 2001; Harding 2011; Phoenix 2017).  
More generally, feminist scholars pointed out that women simply continued to be ignored in 
most of the more thoroughly sociological genres of criminological scholarship, despite their 
use of methods and focus on forms of behaviour which should have made gender norms a 
central category of inquiry and analysis.   This move in criminology towards the sociological 
analysis of the mechanisms of power, the cultural forces, the institutional structures and the 
socio-economic conditions which shape different forms of crime has led to a diversification 
of the field into a wide array of sub-genres (see for example Liebling et al 2017). It has also 
implied a greater and greater division between legal and criminological analysis, with 
criminal law and criminal justice increasingly ideologically shaped by a moral ontology 
which is open to social science or other scrutiny in only strictly circumscribed ways.   But it 
is important to note that, on each of the most plausible general criminological theories – those 
rooted in opportunity, those focused on the power of crime-inhibiting mechanisms of control, 
and those concerned with labelling - one might have expected to see, particularly in the 
second half of the 20th Century, significant changes in both women’s offending and practices 
of naming/identifying it. 
 
To sum up: In accordance with both cultural and economic changes – notably increasing 
levels of education, the expansion of the academy, the development of technologies which 
make it easier to disseminate both academic and literary texts, as well as to produce new 
forms of fictional representation – both literary fiction and criminal justice diversified in the 
second half of the 20th Century. This makes generalisation, the identification of patterns  and 
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the building of even speculative explanatory theses ever more perilous.  And yet, as I hope to 
have shown, we can nonetheless identify some broad trends and analogies, as modernism is 
followed by a partial revival of realism, and penal welfarism is partially supplanted by a 
revived neoclassical retributivism and a new form of focus on character.  With these patterns 
in mind, let us now turn back to our principal topic – that of the light which a juxtaposition of 
legal and literary sources can shed on the understanding of women’s criminalisation.   
 
 
Gender, power and agency in Twentieth Century literature: sexuality and deception; 
eccentrics, madwomen and murderees… 
How, then, are women’s agency, responsibility and terrain for action represented in 20th 
Century literary fiction of a broadly realist temper?  If we leave aside the criminal 
classification statutes, with their pathologised image of fallen women and inebriates (Zedner 
1991), the headline story of female crime at the beginning of the Century was, of course, that 
of the suffragettes: a powerful image of women’s agency and one which must have been 
reinforced for contemporaries by the hunger strikes in which many imprisoned suffragettes 
engaged.  And indeed in the literary sphere, the Century starts promisingly enough in terms 
of literary depictions of female agency and counter-cultural capacity.  A key example is 
Henry James’ The Wings of the Dove (1902).  In this devastating book, the beautiful, 
damaged, ambitious and certainly very will-ful Kate Croy, rejecting the advantageous 
marriage prospects which her wealthy and controlling aunt has planned for her, becomes 
secretly engaged to the besotted, impecunious and far less psychologically powerful Morton 
Densher, whom she then manipulates into deceiving terminally ill heiress Millie Theale that 
he is in love with her. Millie, a quietly powerful figure in her own right, discovers the truth, 
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but nonetheless – we are led to believe – in an extraordinary act of love – or is it of revenge, 
or simply resignation? - leaves her fortune to him.   Kate and Morton now have the means to 
marry.  But though Kate has won her dangerous game, their relationship is polluted, and 
James gives us a vivid sense of the very self – that of Morton – dissolving, and then resisting, 
under the pressure of the moral dilemma which the destruction of their moral integrity entails.   
As for Kate, she hovers in James’ portrayal, a troubling metaphor for fin de siècle perplexity 
about women’s social position: highly capable and agentic, but damaged by a toxic mix of 
indulgence and neglect.  A dutiful daughter of a manipulative and degenerate father, a hint of 
the genetic inheritance so central to the criminology of the time is eclipsed in James’ 
portrayal by the shaping force of the gender and class norms, and the norms of filial 
obligation, which encase and constrain her.  Kate is a luminously capable and agentic figure, 
but one with no real scope to exercise her considerable talents in a productive way.  With a 
foot in both modernist and realist camps, this novel gives a vivid sense of female capacity 
and wilful agency, and of the exquisitely controlled terrain, shaped by legal norms and social 
conventions, over which women might exercise it at the start of the Century. 
 
Kate’s deceptiveness echoes back to Victorian associations between feminine deviance and 
dishonesty – an association which persists in both literary fiction and criminology (Lacey 
2013).  But her cruel and counterproductive conduct reaches beyond mere dishonesty, and if 
literary heroines had continued to develop in the mould of Kate Croy, one feels that the true 
descendants of Moll Flanders – though considerably more complex psychologically - would 
have been walking the pages of English novels far earlier and more frequently in the 20th 
Century than they in fact did.  Instead, Millie Theale is perhaps a better bellwether for the 
literary fate of women: capable, yet often portrayed as complicit in their own victimisation.  
But Kate does prefigure what turns out to be a pervasive feature of 20th Century female 
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literary deviance: her criminal or counter-cultural behaviour is not merely motivated by her 
desire for the financial independence which underpins agency, but also framed by love or 
sexual desire, and hence re-domesticated within the usual gender hierarchy. Think, for 
example, of Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley (1928), who flouts strong social conventions of both 
class and gender to pursue her feelings for gamekeeper Mellors.16  Or of Fay Weldon’s Ruth 
of The Life and Loves of a She-Devil (1983), who indulges in a range of criminal conduct, 
much of it involving deception, as well as acts of positively Gothic self harm, to revenge 
herself on her unfaithful husband and his lover – using the norms of exaggerated femininity 
moreover to do so.  By the early 21st Century, this love motive can at least take lesbian form, 
as it does in Sarah Waters’ The Paying Guests (2014), in which the hitherto appallingly 
dutiful Frances Wray sleepwalks millimetre by millimetre (with one enormous leap in 
between) into colluding in the concealment of a homicide committed by her lover.  But the 
literary trope of female moral choice and action shaped – even distorted - by sexual passion 
remains remarkably constant.  In fact the painful depiction of constrained yet potentially 
destabilising female sexuality is remarkably consistent with that explored in Radclyffe Hall’s 
Stephen Gordon of The Well of Loneliness (1928) – a book with strong intertextual resonance 
                                                          
16  Likewise the violent attempt and intention, respectively, of Hermione and Gudrun in D. H. 
Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920) are motivated by their intense feelings for men, even 
though each of them is represented as having a certain independence, the first because of 
inherited wealth, the latter because she has a profession as a teacher and considerable skill 
and reputation as a sculptress. Indeed Gudrun, by throwing up her independence to follow 
Gerald, albeit temporarily, comes – knowingly – close to becoming a ‘murderee’: see note 25 
below. 
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with Waters’ novel in a number of ways, not least in its setting in the early 20th Century and 
portrayal of a minor character with a close resemblance to Stephen Gordon.17   
 
Legal and literary tendencies to frame female crime in terms of sexuality and deception are 
tellingly brought together in F Tennyson Jesse’s A Pin to See the Peepshow (1934), in which 
Julia Almond18 has her motivations interpreted by lawyers, judge and jury through the lens of 
gendered stereotypes about the deceptiveness of a woman determined to escape her husband 
and protect her lover. Perhaps yet more significant, however, is how little this narrative 
structure changes over the next 80 years.  The deceptive and sexually framed female crime of 
Yvonne Carmichael in Louise Doughty’s Apple Tree Yard (2013) bears a striking, and 
dispiriting, resemblance to that of Julia Almond: a woman of good standing whose character 
and credibility are destroyed by the discovery of her deception.  One change is, however, 
                                                          
17  Indeed the orientation of strong female characters towards men is reflected in literature 
well beyond the terrain of crime or even markedly counter-cultural behaviour. For example, 
Harriet, the central figure in Olivia Manning’s Balkan Trilogy (1956 – 1964) and Levant 
Trilogy (1977 – 1980) – a strong figure and an educated woman - loyally follows in the path 
of her feckless husband Guy, even in the face of his callous self-centredness, and 
notwithstanding feeling that ‘[A]mid the bovine atmosphere of collegiate maleness she was 
just a skirt with a library book’ (1956-64/2012: loc. 1360).  Cf. Hervey Russell, a strong 
character at the centre of Storm Jameson’s None Turn Back (1936): ‘She had no ambitions of 
her own; if she shone, it must be in order to see some man roused and admiring. She felt 
convinced that she could help an ambitious man to be successful.’ (1936/2011, loc. 2580). 
18 Almond is based on the real (and convicted) murder defendant Edith Thompson: see 
Afterword by Elaine Morgan in Tennyson Jesse (1934/1979: 405-8). 
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clear: unlike Almond, the very sexualisation of Carmichael’s alleged crime, while further 
damaging her credibility, underpins her fundamental lack of perceived dangerousness.  
Carmichael’s conviction is for perjury rather than murder; but the criminal law’s disciplinary 
force pales beside that of prevailing social norms.  
 
This is most assuredly not to deny that there are developments in the English novel of key 
significance for understanding how agency, its gendering and the opportunities for exercising 
it are developing.  Particularly in the early part of the Century, with the flourishing of literary 
modernism, the focus on the interior world of subjects, perhaps most especially female 
subjects, is striking.  Indeed, in an exaggerated reflection of what was happening in terms of 
the psychologisation of ideas of criminal responsibility (and of criminal incapacity), 
interiority – echoing the deepening of psychological understandings of criminal responsibility 
– often virtually replaces or displaces plot.  This is particularly striking in James Joyce’s 
Ulysses (1922), notably in Molly Bloom’s famous soliloquy.  And quite apart from 
exemplifying the novelistic turn to the psychic interior, the soliloquy is a fascinating 
commentary on gender difference.  On the one hand, Molly’s sense of self is saturated with 
the body and with sex, in a way reminiscent of the features of Lady Chatterley’s Lover (1920) 
which make it uncomfortable reading for today’s feminist.  On the other hand, Molly is an 
astute commentator on men’s combined arrogance, brutishness and fragility, repeatedly 
commenting on their need to appear to control things (and indeed implying their 
ineffectiveness in doing so…).   In a lovely moment of irony, she describes a lover as an 
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‘ignoramus that doesn’t know poetry from a cabbage’ (Joyce 1922/2016: loc 13838)19 and 
conjectures that the world would go better if run by women. 
 
Interiority, alongside a heightened sense of the self and it complex relation to the social, is 
also central of course to the tone and focus of Virginia Woolf’s literary fiction in novels such 
as Mrs Dalloway (1925) and Orlando (1928).  Indeed Orlando explicitly ponders not only the 
social construction of gender (‘She was becoming a little more modest, as women are, of 
their brains, and a little more vain, as women are, of her person’ (Woolf 1928/Kindle: loc. 
1770) but also the multiplicity of the self.  In proto-postmodern style, Woolf brings the self 
into being as a question or a project rather than a represented discovery.  Orlando’s (1928) 
combined perception of the upsides of feminine identification/sociality and critique of the 
constraints on women is strikingly fresh almost a century after its publication.  Though often 
thought of as an extended love letter, Orlando is also a seriously political novel: its portrayal 
of the social habitus and power structure of gender self-discipline is decades before its time - 
indeed positively Foucauldian. And it marks the emergence of radical idea of gender as a 
spectrum, as fluid – an idea which is arguably only coming to practical fruition in the western 
world in the early 21st Century.  Indeed it is hard to come up with many 20th Century novels 
with such a straightforwardly agentic and central (partially) female character.  
 
This leads to a further theme which emerges from the novels:  that many of the instances of 
counter-cultural feminine agency in 20th Century literature are women who have in some 
                                                          
19 This quotation is taken from the eighth sentence of Molly Bloom’s soliloquy at the end of 
Ulysses. 
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sense cast off or distanced themselves from a conventional femininity or even femaleness, 
while at the same time using all the psychological mechanisms through which women are 
typically able to exercise power.  A fascinating example is Elizabeth Bowen’s Mme Fisher of 
The House in Paris (1926) – one of the most cruel and manipulative female figures in 20th 
Century literature, and one whose relationship to femininity is at once emphasised and 
distanced.  She exercises a key part of her power to manipulate and indeed destroy others 
psychologically through her role as a mother and through her preternaturally acute sense of 
other’s psychic vulnerabilities; but her invalid status, age and widowhood render her relation 
to norms of sexualised femininity oblique.  Weldon’s ‘she-devil’ Ruth20 – perhaps an ironic 
play on Defoe’s ‘she-merchant’, Roxana (1724) – engages in criminal conduct of which she 
is unashamed; and she draws on both her intelligence and hyper-conventional femininity to 
plan and execute it.   Ironically, however, she draws on a number of stereotypically female 
capacities – domestic and child-rearing skills for example – to effect part of her revenge, and 
ultimately rebuilds herself a sexually attractive woman, through an exaggerated form of 
cosmetic surgery which shifts the novel from realism into fantasy, in the ultimate stages of 
her plot. 21  So Ruth is only a very approximate descendant of Moll Flanders.  It is moreover 
                                                          
20  See for example Weldon 1983: 48-9: indeed Ruth experiences her husband’s labelling of 
her as a ‘she-devil’ as a liberation: “if you are a she devil the mind clears at once. The spirits 
rise. There is no shame, no guilt, no dreary striving to be good.  There is only, in the end, 
what you want.  And I can take what I want. I am a she devil!’  
21  Weldon’s sequel, Death of a She-Devil (2017) sees Ruth further punished by her own self-
assertion, as the physical effects of her cosmetic surgery, her unreliable powers of judgement, 
and the perfidy of her associates sees the sisterhood which she has established implode in 
what can only be described as Gothic style.  The novel is hard to interpret, but at best 
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worth noting that among her stereotypically feminine tools we must include a highly 
developed capacity for deception – something which also occupies, not surprisingly, a key 
place in instances of women’s crime in crime fiction, a key example being Agatha Christie’s 
Witness for the Prosecution (1925). 
 
Beyond deception, the pervasive sexual context of female literary deviance, and its 
distinctively gendered modality, two further themes emerge strongly from 20Th Century 
literary representations of female deviance. One is a preoccupation with mental instability 
and mental illness, and with the fragility of the line between mental health and mental illness, 
as well as a determination to explore the multiplicity and instability of the self in ways 
prefigured by 19th Century sensation fiction but in an entirely fresh and far more subjective 
psychological form. The critique of a binary split between sanity and insanity with which 
many novels engage – Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway (1924); Antonia White’s Frost in May 
(1933) and Beyond the Glass (1954), or Doris Lessing’s The Four-Gated City (1969) and The 
Golden Notebook (1969) –  is of particular interest from this point of view. Again, this is a 
luxury which the law, engaged as it is in a project of classification and judgment, cannot 
indulge: and yet it struggles with the very same dilemma in court rooms, legislatures and jury 
rooms.  The gendered nature of its judgments is evident – as in the well known pattern of 
constructing women’s self defence in terms of mental incapacity defences (Nicolson and 
Sanghvi 1993).  
 
                                                          
pessimistic about, and at worst contemptuous of, the feminism which might have been seen 
to inform the original book. 
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A second theme, abutting that of madness or instability, is that of eccentricity. Many novels 
portray even vivid and powerful female protagonists as in some sense pathetic, eccentric or 
marginalised: think, for example, of Muriel Spark’s painfully brave yet out of touch Jean 
Brodie of The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961). There is an interesting contrast here with 
Graham Greene’s and Angela Carter’s deliciously unapologetic (and occasionally criminal) 
eccentrics, Augusta Bertram and Nora and Dora Chance of, respectively, Travels with my 
Aunt (1969) and Wise Children (1991) – raising an interesting question as to whether the 
space to adopt an eccentric persona is one, small piece of social space gained by late 20th 
Century women, in an intriguing (dis)analogy with Moll Flanders’ more straightforwardly 
deviant persona.  Note, however, that these happy, agentic female eccentrics walk the pages 
of books which in significant respects exceed the bounds of realism.  Virginia Woolf’s 
Orlando is once again the paradigm here: surely the most transgressive novel of the early 20th 
Century in gender terms, and one which also presages a tendency to displace representations 
of female crime and deviance onto earlier historical periods.22  For example, Woolf 
anticipates Carter’s (or Weldon’s) displacement of female agency into imagined worlds, with 
Evelyn/Eve’s (The Passion of New Eve 1977) punitive feminisation and feminised 
victimisation representing a more violent version of Orlando’s discovery of increasingly 
constraining gender norms amid her sexual transposition across the centuries.  At the end of 
the Century, Sarah Waters’ imaginative reworking of the Victorian gothic around lesbian 
sexuality (Fingersmith 2002;  Affinity 1999) features a range of criminal and deviant women, 
of whom Grace Sucksby of Fingersmith – an intelligent rogue who is ultimately not without 
                                                          
22  Again, this is a tendency which also marks 19th Century novels, whose representations of 
female deviance are often set at safe historical or geographical distance: see Lacey 2008: 
223-4. 
 37 
heart - is probably the closest analogue of Moll Flanders which I have encountered in my 
reading so far.23  
 
Novelists tackling similar issues from a more conventionally realist method tend to portray a 
world in which, notwithstanding the possibilities of crossing or mixing of gender identities, 
the norms remain as fixed – and as potentially brutal to those who transcend them – as ever.  
Here Jackie Kay’s Trumpet (1998), based on the true story of a jazz musician who lived as a 
man, and whose ‘exposure’ as a woman after his death causes psychic shock and public 
scandal, is a paradigm – as are Jeanette Winterson’s Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (1985) 
and Sebastian Barry’s Days without End (2016).  In these books, questions are raised about 
why, respectively, gender and sexuality, are treated as so central to human identity and 
relationships.  It is a theme on which literature has moved light years ahead of law.  In an 
exemplary recent case, a woman who had deceived another young woman into believing that 
she was a man, and then engaged in penetrative sex with her using a prosthesis, was 
convicted of sexual assault by penetration – an offence equivalent in seriousness to rape, and 
earning her a six and a half year custodial sentence. It was simply assumed that the deception 
as to sex/gender – unlike deceptions as to age, marital or health status, or an intention to pay, 
in a sex work context – was a fundamental issue going to consent.24 
                                                          
23 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the Sue Trinder /Grace Sucksby pairing 
equates to that of Moll and her older ‘governess’: see Lacey 2008: 224 n. 62. 
24 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/29/gayle-newland-found-guilty-at-retrial-
of-tricking-female-friend-into-sex ; https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/20/gay 
le-newland-jailed-for-tricking-female-friend-into-sex  (accessed September 18 2017).   
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In short, as far as I have been able to discern, crime is exceptionally rare for female heroines 
beyond the specific genre of crime fiction, and even here, deception, particularly in a sexual 
context, predominates as the quintessential modality of the female offender.  Beyond crime 
fiction, or literary fiction deploying historical displacement or elements of magical realism, 
though deviant behaviour and its temptations remain a theme of the novel, these are played 
out over a small canvass in terms of conduct - while a huge one in terms of emotions. And 
this leads to a final, very dark theme, exemplified by Nicola Six, anti-heroine of Martin 
Amis’s London Fields (1987): a hyper-sexualised, thoroughly agentic but very damaged 
woman who uses her considerable rational and sexual powers to manipulate two men in such 
a way as to produce her own murder.  Almost like Millie Theale, Nicola’s role in the novel is 
that of ‘murderee’, as Amis puts it.25 The message is clear: a wilfully deviant woman can 
                                                          
25  Amis is here echoing Birkin of Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920), who is in turn echoed 
by Dinah, the unconventional younger sister in Rosamond Lehman’s The Echoing Grove 
(1953), in which she identifies herself as having neared this role at various points in her life: 
‘Some women do get drawn into the aura [of other couples’ ‘nerve storms’], though. They get 
to be murderees.  You can smell it in them. I know what you mean. I was pretty rank myself 
once.’ (Lehman 1953/Kindle: loc 5600 p 294); see Eagleton 2005: 263).  Female murderees 
are distressingly common in 20th Century literary fiction.  Also notable in this context is the 
co-optation of Mme Fisher’s almost impossibly dutiful and thoroughly damaged daughter, 
Naomi, in the exercise of her power, notwithstanding Naomi’s recognition of ‘evil’ in the 
house: indeed both Naomi and Karen come close to being, like Max – and at least at a 
spiritual level – murderees, effaced by Mme Fisher’s malign will (Bowen, The House in 
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expect to be murdered.   Nicola Six is a murderee who combines Millie Theale’s fatalism 
with Kate Croy’s wilful and cold resourcefulness.  Bisecting the period which separates 
Millie from Nicola, Daphne du Maurier’s immortal Rebecca (1938) provides another telling 
metaphor of 20th Century literary fiction’s preoccupation with the female murderee.  Indeed 
Rebecca’s ultimate triumph over both her husband and her successor as Mrs de Winter might 
stand as the epitome of 20th Century female literary agency: her power is psychological, 
exercised through her hold over the minds of others; and her ultimate use of that power - 
resistant to the patriarchal structure within which her marriage has confined her though it 
may be - consists in an act of indirect self-destruction.26  If this is progress in terms of the 
power of female agency, it is the very reverse in terms of the terrain over which, and the 
means by which, that agency is represented as being played out. 
                                                          
Paris 1926). My thanks to Quentin Skinner for suggesting that Millie could be seen as a 
murderee. 
Beyond the specific purview of this paper, but a feature of London Fields  which cannot 
escape comment in any feminist text, is Amis’s equation, in Keith’s persona, of femaleness 
with rapability: see for example Amis (1987:168). It is an association which is also visited, in 
a more thoughtful and critical way, in Angela Carter’s The Passion of New Eve, in the 
persona of Eve, who as a former man reconstructed as a woman, experiences a rape from, as 
it were, both gender subject positions:  her rapist ‘forced me to know myself as a former 
violator at the moment of my own violation. When he entered me, the act seemed to be one 
of seppuku, a ritual disembowelment I committed upon myself…) (Carter 1977: 98) 
26 This is of course to say nothing of the other strongly counter-normative female figure in 
Rebecca: the powerful and sinister Mrs Danvers, who offers a paradigm of deceptive female 
literary deviance, and one in which there is more than a hint of (vicarious) erotic pleasure. 
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In conclusion 
The main message from the realist literary tradition through the 20th and into the early 21st 
Century from my reading is therefore that – in keeping with the still modest place of women 
in the criminal courts and prisons of England and Wales – their literary representations and 
preoccupations remain remarkably confined.  Countercultural 20th Century literary women 
exert a power which emerges from the personal, emotional, interior; which is motivated by 
relationships, romance and sexual jealousy; which is effected by deception; which often 
features mental breakdown; which is invariably shaped by pressures within a family, sexual 
and patriarchal context; and which may be rendered less threatening by being displaced in 
time.  I would love to be directed to any good examples – particularly counter-examples to 
this interpretation.  But as things stand, my conclusion is that parallels between literary and 
legal representations of women are every bit as strong as they were in the 18th and 19th 
Centuries, suggesting that changes in women’s legal and political status and economic 
opportunities have not been accompanied by nearly such a vivid change in underlying 
constructions of gender difference.   For worse, or perhaps better, the harder edges of formal 
state control represented by the official crime and imprisonment figures pale into 
insignificance alongside the informal discipline exerted by conventional gender norms and 
the power structures which sustain them – norms which are vividly represented in the novel.  
Sexualisation in particular remains a key means of denigration and control: indeed, ironically 
– and as perhaps reflected in social media assaults on women – it may have strengthened in 
the wake of the greater sexual freedom ostensibly accorded to women in recent decades.    As 
women’s undoubted progress in the worlds of work, politics and education continues, this 
under-representation may seem unimportant, indeed something to be celebrated.  It would, 
after all, be absurd to regard a rise in women’s representation among offenders as a salutary 
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marker of gender equality.  But we should remember that these same differences – related as 
they are to surrounding structures of power – may also be the very things which keep women 
radically under-represented in the very top echelons of business, political, legal and media 
worlds, and often – Hillary Clinton offers a vivid recent example – vilified and disrespected 
when they enter these realms.  Yet more important, they continue to expose women to 
disproportionate levels of poverty and sexual exploitation and make them vulnerable to 
violence.   
 
This finding of a relatively modest imaginative terrain over which counter-normative female 
behaviour is played out in the pages of realist literary fiction echoes, of course, the relatively 
modest changes in the gender ratio of criminalisation and imprisonment during the course of 
the Century.   It echoes, moreover, the continuing marginalisation of women in criminology.  
A vigorous incursion of feminist analysis and argument into the field from the late 1960s to 
the end of the Century exposed the gendered assumptions which underpinned not only the 
intellectually discredited essentialism of early positivist criminology, but also the troubling 
paternalism and sheer sexism of the differential treatment of female delinquents; the rank 
misogyny of the law, and/or the implementation of the law, on abortion, divorce, rape, incest, 
infanticide, prostitution, domestic violence; and the frequent construction of women reacting 
to male violence in terms of mental incapacity defences rather than the more agentic 
framework of self defence.  But, forty years after the publication of Smart’s pioneering 
Women, Crime and Criminology (Smart 1976) – indeed half a century after Frances 
Heidensohn’s key article (Heidensohn 1968) – the field has proved resistant to the kind of 
integrated gender analysis which Smart persuasively argued to be needed to produce a 
discipline capable of truly shedding light on not only women’s but men’s behaviour and 
official reactions to it.  Criminology remains fascinated by why people commit crime rather 
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than why they comply with the law, and hence with men: and in criminological terms, while, 
ostensibly, women’s opportunities have increased, their capacity to take them up remains 
differentially constrained by informal social controls – confirming Feeley and Aviram’s 
speculation that the private patriarchy which shaped the decline of women in the criminal 
process in the late 18th and 19th Centuries has survived the 20th to a greater degree than one 
might have expected.  Moreover these same gender norms doubtless have effects – 
exaggerated though the so-called ‘leniency hypothesis’ about reluctance to criminalise 
women may often have been – on gendering the social construction of crime by officials and 
members of the public.  
 
In terms, finally, of my argument about the re-emergence of character responsibility in the 
late 20th Century – a development which we might expect to have some significance to 
gender patterns of criminalisation - some possible hypotheses about these connections present 
themselves.  One of them is this:  To the extent that the huge economic shocks of the 1970s 
and since, along with the social changes which they brought in their wake, have affected the 
status system which I argued in Women Crime and Character (2008) to have been a key part 
of what shaped legal and literary patterns of female deviance, that realignment has in some 
ways increased women’s status relative to men’s.  (Think, for example, of the figures on 
higher education presented in Figure 5 above.)  Arguably, phenomena such as the increasing 
harassment of women on social media is a backlash against this realignment of gender 
opportunities and status.  In other words, women’s material progress may have called forth an 
intensification of informal social control.   In criminal justice, the new forms of character-
assisted responsibility attribution are themselves targeted at forms of conduct which remain 
male-dominated (itself, of course, a matter to be explained).  So one broad possibility would 
be that the (relative, and still far from complete) gains made by women are either reinforcing 
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incentives for women not to offend, and diminishing fears about women’s crime; while doing 
exactly the reverse for men (particularly, of course, some groups of men).   And in terms of 
labelling, the emerging hybrid pattern of bad character and risk – the new form of character 
responsibility - invokes an image of dangerousness from which women are relatively 
insulated by prevailing gender norms.   
 
Whatever the truth of this preliminary interpretation, one point – at once methodological and 
substantive – emerges.  The relative stability of the gender patterns of criminalisation over 
the course of the 20th Century suggest that material changes themselves are an incomplete 
explanation of the development of the social phenomena of criminalisation and punishment 
over time.  What cultural forms such as literary fiction help us to appreciate is the key role 
played by gender norms, expectations and assumptions in shaping human judgment or 
behaviour: that of people defining rules and conventions; that of those breaching established 
rules and conventions; and that of those interpreting and responding to perceived breaches.  
As well as a case study in the potential for bringing law, criminal justice and literature, the 
social sciences and the humanities, into dialogue, then, I offer this paper as a case study in the 
pitfalls of the prevailing strong tendency in the social sciences to separate quantitative and 
qualitative approaches; and to separate questions of material power and interest from 
questions of culture.  Bringing these different questions and methods together does not 
always produce the clear results beloved of an academy increasingly concerned with auditing 
and ranking.  But it is the only way to begin to tackle the large and urgent explanatory 
questions which, surely, justify the academy’s existence. 
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